ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature:Age Differences and Delinquency
Kathryn Lynn Modecki
Published online: 2 June 2007
� American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association 2007
Abstract Over the past decade, a majority of states have
legislated to expand their capacity to try adolescents as
adults [Griffin (2003). Trying and sentencing juveniles as
adults: An analysis of state transfer and blended sentencing
laws. Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice].
In response, researchers have investigated factors that may
affect adolescent culpability [Steinberg and Scott (Am
Psychol 58(12):1009–1018, 2003)]. Research on immature
judgment posits that psychosocial influences on adolescent
decision processes results in reduced criminal responsibil-
ity [Cauffman and Steinberg (Behav Sci Law 18(6):741–
760, 2000); Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard (Law Hum
Behav 19(3):221–244, 1995); Steinberg and Cauffman
(Law Hum Behav 20(3):249–272, 1996)]. The current
study utilizes hypothetical vignettes and standardized
measures of maturity of judgment (responsibility, temper-
ance, and perspective) to examine gaps in previous matu-
rity of judgment findings (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000).
This work suggests that adolescents (ages 14–17) display
less responsibility and perspective relative to college stu-
dents (ages 18–21), young-adults (ages 22–27), and adults
(ages 28–40). Further, this research finds no maturity of
judgment differences between delinquent and non-delin-
quent youth, but does find significant maturity of judgment
differences between high and low delinquency male youth.
Finally, results show that maturity of judgment predicts
self-reported delinquency beyond the contributions of age,
gender, race, education level, SES, and antisocial decision
making. Implications for the juvenile justice system are
discussed.
Keywords Adolescents � Maturity of judgment �Decision making � Juvenile justice � Delinquency �Adolescent and adult differences
The Supreme Court recently ruled that the juvenile death
penalty was ‘‘cruel and unusual punishment’’ in Roper v.
Simmons (No. 03-633). Yet voters continue to advocate
juvenile punishment over rehabilitation (Griffin 2003)
based on the notion that an adult crime compels an adult
punishment (Scott and Grisso 1997). Lawmakers may
justify punitive trends based on their belief that adolescents
have adequate moral judgment and self-control to be held
fully culpable for their crimes (Scott and Grisso 1997). In
contrast, numerous developmental theorists maintain that
adolescents, ages 13–18, may lack the judgmental maturity
to make decisions based on their own inclinations and
principles (e.g., Reppucci 1999; Scott et al. 1995; Steinberg
and Cauffman 1996). Further, adolescent inclinations and
principles may differ from those of adults and thus may be
considered ‘‘misguided.’’ The maturity of judgment per-
spective argues that adolescents are confronted with psy-
chosocial factors (i.e., emotional and social influences)
(Cauffman 1996) that are unique to their developmental
period (Scott and Woolard 2004). These psychosocial
influences contribute to immature judgment, which affects
adolescent decision making, particularly in antisocial
contexts (Cauffman 1996). Accordingly, due to immaturity
of judgment, adolescents’ antisocial decisions should be
viewed through a lens of mitigated criminal culpability
(Scott et al. 1995; Steinberg and Scott 2003).
This research was conducted in partial fulfillment of the M.A degree
in Psychology from the University of New Hampshire.
K. L. Modecki (&)
Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Conant Hall, 10
Library Way, Durham, NH 03824, USA
e-mail: [emailprotected]
123
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
DOI 10.1007/s10979-007-9087-7
Although several landmark empirical studies have
investigated adolescent maturity of judgment in relation to
antisocial decision making (e.g., Cauffman and Steinberg
2000; Fried and Reppucci 2001), this work has compared
adolescents to college students or has lacked age-based
contrasts beyond age 18. Yet physiological research sug-
gests that age-based brain maturation, which may be linked
to maturity of judgment factors (Bennett and Baird in press),
does not occur until the early twenties (Sowell et al. 2001).
Thus, college students may not be equipped for mature
judgment themselves. Further, although preliminary work
has linked adolescent immature judgment to antisocial
decision making, this work has lacked measures of criminal
involvement, such as self-report delinquency (Cauffman and
Steinberg 2000). Finally, although the maturity of judgment
perspective suggests that adolescent offending may be ac-
counted for, in part, by immature judgment (Cauffman and
Steinberg 2000), only two studies have investigated maturity
of judgment in delinquent youth (Fried and Reppucci 2001;
Grisso et al. 2003). The aim of the current study is to address
these gaps in previous maturity of judgment research.
Juvenile crime, physiology, and maturity of judgment
literature will be reviewed within the framework of
extending past maturity of judgment research.
Juvenile Crime
In recent years, juvenile crime has been approached from an
increasingly punitive direction, as evidenced by increased
transfers of juveniles to criminal court and increased formal
processing of juveniles within the justice system. This
punishment perspective is based on the assumption that
adolescents are sufficiently mature and should be held fully
accountable for their crimes (Slobogin 1999; Steinberg and
Cauffman 1996). However, some authors argue that the
juvenile justice system was created based on an altogether
different idea: adolescents and adults differ in maturity
(Scott and Grisso 1997). Yet this view has increasingly been
called into question, since the Supreme Court ruling, In Re
Gault, in 1967 (Scott and Grisso 1997).
Although rehabilitative efforts continue to exist, since
1967 courts have held adolescents increasingly liable for
their crimes (Scott and Grisso 1997). Between 1987 and
1994, there was a 73% increase in the number of juvenile
cases waived to adult court (Snyder and Sickmund 1999).
Today, over 200,000 adolescents are tried in criminal court
annually (Allard and Young 2002).
At the same time, the juvenile court system’s caseload
has grown overloaded in recent years (Snyder and Sick-
mund 1999). The court’s inundation is the result not only of
increased juvenile crime, but also increased prosecution of
juvenile crime (Snyder 2003). For instance, between 1987
and 1996 there was a 78% increase in formal processing of
delinquency cases (Stahl 1999). Currently one in five
juveniles who encounter police for delinquent behavior is
processed through the legal system (Snyder and Sickmund
1999).
The punitive orientation towards adolescent offending is
particularly striking given that most adolescents will par-
ticipate in at least a few delinquent acts, such as drug use,
school truancy, vandalism, or petty theft (Moffit 1993). In
fact, problem behavior is considered by some theorists to
be a distinctive component of adolescent development
(Baumrind 1987; Moffitt 1993). Many developmental
researchers consider moderate amounts of delinquent
behavior to be typical for adolescents, who attempt to gain
adult-like status through risk-taking behavior (e.g., Moffitt
1993). For most adolescents, delinquency desists on its
own, potentially precipitated by the maturation process
(Moffit 1993; Scott and Grisso 1997).
Moffitt’s (1993) work is consistent with the aggregate
age curve in offending that is seen across cultures and
countries (Gottfredson and Hirshi 1990). In general, the age
curve shows crime rates escalating rapidly between ages 14
and 15, topping out between ages 16 and 20, and promptly
deescalating (Farrington 1986). Although this curve is an
aggregate and not all individuals show desistance, this
criminological trend seems to reflect adolescents’ natural
maturation. However, proponents of adult criminal sanc-
tions and formal processing argue that adolescent decision
making skills are mature enough both to commit crimes and
to pay serious consequences for such decisions (Scott and
Grisso 1997; Scott et al. 1995). Thus empirical work that
investigates judgmental maturity in relation to antisocial
decision making is germane to arguments that both support
and oppose reduced criminal culpability for adolescents.
Physiological Research
Recent physiological research offers some support for the
hypothesis that adolescent judgment may be relatively
immature as compared to adults. Although this work is in
its initial stages, research suggests that adolescents and
college-aged individuals may have yet to fully develop
neurologically (Bennett and Baird in press; Sowell et al.
1999) and thus may not be equipped for mature judgment.
Brain maturation between adolescence and young adult-
hood has been spatially and temporally mapped using MRI
imaging, indicating that the brain may not mature to adult
capacity until the early twenties (Giedd et al. 1999; Reiss
et al. 1996). This research shows that the brain is signifi-
cantly remodeled during adolescence, which may lead to
increased emotion in information encoding and decision
making (Spear 2000; Yurgelun-Todd 2002). The adolescent
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 79
123
pre-frontal cortex, an area involved in goal-directed
behaviors and emotional processing, is altered appreciably
during this time (Spear 2000). In addition, the frontal lobe,
a region typically utilized by adults for decision processing,
may not reach full maturity until the early twenties (Davies
and Rose 1999). As a surrogate, adolescents may utilize
the basal ganglia for decision processing (Yurgelun-Todd
et al. 2003). This area, part of the amygdala, is frequently
associated with emotion. As adolescent physiological
development favors more emotional processing, such
changes may well be associated with immature judgment.
It is important to note, however, that much work remains to
be realized in this area. Indeed longitudinal research is
currently underway that attempts to link these two devel-
opmental trajectories (T. Grisso, personal communication,
March 9, 2006).
Maturity of Judgment
Although research associating physiological development
and maturity of judgment is only in its initial stage,
developmental research suggests that adolescents’ decision
processes are unduly affected by a variety of social and
environmental factors (Scott et al. 1995). For instance,
adolescent risk decisions are influenced by social pressure,
emotional experiences, and peer norms (Steinberg and
Cauffman 1996). Although adults may experience these
psychosocial factors, adult decisions are thought to reflect
their own choices and preferences, whereas adolescent
choices may not (Steinberg and Scott 2003). The term
‘‘maturity of judgment’’ has been coined to reflect the
influence of such psychosocial factors on the cognitive
decision process (Cauffman and Steinberg 1995; Steinberg
and Cauffman 1996).
Past research has varied in its operationalization of
maturity of judgment. The Scott et al. (1995) judgment
framework encompasses decreased risk perception and fu-
ture-time perspective, and increased peer influence. Stein-
berg and Cauffman (1996) posit that three more general
factors may comprise maturity of judgment and thus affect
adolescent decision making: responsibility (the ability to act
independently and to be self-sufficient), temperance (the
ability to evaluate a situation before acting), and perspective
(the ability to consider different viewpoints when making
decisions) (Steinberg and Cauffman 1996; Cauffman and
Steinberg 2000). The current study is based on the later,
more expansive maturity of judgment framework of
responsibility, temperance, and perspective.
In all, factors of maturity of judgment have been con-
ceptualized as dispositions that interact with decision
contexts; thus an individual’s judgmental maturity may
vary from one circ*mstance to the next (Steinberg and
Cauffman 1996). However, adolescents are especially
likely to face risky choices (Baumrind 1987), wherein peer
norms, sensation seeking, and future time perspective may
unduly affect their decision processes (Scott and Grisso
1997). Consequently, maturity of judgment is most ger-
mane to such risk-laden contexts.
Thus, maturity of judgment research informs the on-
going legislative debate regarding adolescent culpability
(Steinberg and Cauffman 1996), based on the thesis that
without mature, competent decision making, adolescents
should not be held as accountable as adults for their crimes
(Woolard et al. 1996). However, the maturity of judgment
perspective suggests a developmental inclination towards
immature reasoning in antisocial decisions making; this
perspective does not argue for a lack of criminal culpability
(Steinberg and Scott 2003). Instead, maturity of judgment
suggests reduced culpability based on developmental dif-
ferences between adolescent and adult antisocial decision
making (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000). Further, this per-
spective acknowledges significant within group variability,
such that individual adolescents may display judgment that
is relatively mature and such that individual adults may
display judgment that is relatively immature (Cauffman
and Steinberg 2000).
Next Steps
Social science research has only recently focused
empirically on maturity of judgment and its influence on
adolescent decision making (Fried and Reppucci 2001;
Grisso et al. 2003; Woolard et al. 2001). While a number
of empirical works have provided significant grounding
within the maturity of judgment framework several
gaps remain, a number of which the current study seeks
to fill.
The first gap in previous maturity of judgment research
is a lack of adult judgment comparisons. For instance,
Cauffman and Steinberg’s (2000) landmark research on
maturity of judgment suggests that maturity of judgment
predicts antisocial decision making and that adolescents are
less psychosocially mature and more likely to make anti-
social decisions than college students. Yet physiological
research suggests that college-aged individuals themselves
may continue to undergo brain-based maturation that could
conceivably be linked to immature judgment (Bennett and
Baird in press). Thus, inclusion of samples beyond college
age is central to informing questions of maturation beyond
adolescence. In addition, Cauffman and Steinberg found
that antisocial decision making remains relatively stable
after age 19. Yet it is unclear whether this result is due to
their college-student sample, which had a mean age of 25.
Both physiological (Giedd et al. 1999; Reiss et al. 1996)
80 Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
123
and sociological (Farrington 1986) research would suggest
that antisocial decision making should continue to decline
for many individuals through the early twenties. Thus, one
direction for future research includes investigating maturity
of judgment in adult samples beyond the age of 25.
A second gap in current adolescent maturity of judgment
literature is a need for indices of criminal involvement. For
instance, past work has utilized antisocial decision making
vignettes that are couched in psychosocial contexts to as-
sess decision outcomes (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000).
However, because the maturity of judgment perspective
attempts to account for age-based differences in crime
(Steinberg and Cauffman 1996), maturity of judgment re-
search should also focus on involvement in illegal acts.
Responses to decision making vignettes may be correlated
with engagement in delinquent acts, but empirical evidence
in this area has been inconsistent. For instance, in a study
comparing judgment factors in adolescents and adults in
pre-trial detention, a different pattern of results was found
for hypothetical peer-focuses vignettes versus what indi-
viduals stated that they, themselves, would do (Schmidt
et al. 2003). Age did predict recommendations to a peer
regarding communication with an attorney, but did not
predict participant self-reports regarding their own com-
munication with an attorney. Thus, future research would
benefit from self-report measures of delinquency, in addi-
tion to antisocial decision making vignettes.
A third gap of critical interest to maturity of judgment
research involves adolescent within-group variability. De-
tained adolescents, those individuals who are most likely to
come before the courts and who are most affected by ques-
tions of criminal culpability, are often excluded from
empirical decision making research (Mulvey and Peeples
1996). Normative adolescent samples are useful for making
age-based judgment comparisons with normative adults
(Woolard et al. 1996). However, inclusion of institutional-
ized delinquent samples would allow for maturity of judg-
ment comparisons that reflect within-group differences,
potentially based on delinquency status (Grisso 1996; Mul-
vey and Peeples 1996; Woolard et al.), though few studies to
date do so (Fried and Reppucci 2001; Steinberg et al. 2003)
Only a single study has investigated the relation between
psychosocial judgment factors and antisocial decisions in
detained and non-detained adolescents (Fried and Reppucci
2001). This work, based on a sample of 56 adolescents,
found that delinquent youth displayed increased future-
orientation and diminished peer influence as compared to
their non-detained peers, but found no differences in risk
perception. Yet these findings are of questionable gener-
alizability based on the study’s small sample size.
A more extensive study included measures of psycho-
social judgment factors in detained and non-detained
adolescents and adults, although this work investigated
competence to stand trial, as compared to antisocial deci-
sion making (Steinberg et al. 2003). Research based on 927
adolescents in juvenile detention facilities and community
settings and 466 young adults in jails and the community,
found that judgment factors affected individuals’ func-
tioning as defendants, regardless of their detained status.
While this work is highly comprehensive in its sampling,
the investigational focus does not allow for a comparison
of maturity of judgment factors between adolescent groups,
nor does this work examine the relation between maturity
of judgment factors and antisocial decision making.
The present study speaks to these gaps in the literature.
Based on recent physiological research (Bennett and Baird
in press), college students should display more mature
judgment than adolescents, but less mature judgment than
young-adults and adults. Similar age-based differences
should be found for antisocial decision making (Cauffman
and Steinberg 2000) and delinquency, such that adolescents
are most likely to engage in antisocial decisions and
delinquency, followed by college-student, young-adults,
and adults. Since past research suggests that maturity of
judgment predicts antisocial decision making as measured
by vignettes (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000), it is hypoth-
esized that maturity of judgment will predict self-report
delinquency scores above and beyond antisocial decision
making. Finally, the current study compares male adoles-
cent and delinquent youth samples on facets of maturity of
judgment. It is hypothesized that delinquent youth will
display less mature judgment than male adolescents.
Method
Participants
The current study consisted of five samples: adolescent,
college-student, young-adult, adult, and delinquent indi-
viduals. The samples differed in terms of their population
characteristics: the adolescent sample was drawn from a
high school, the college students from a state university,
the young-adult and adult samples were drawn from a
community sample collected by undergraduate researchers,
and the delinquent youth were drawn from a state juvenile
delinquent facility. Thus, the groups may have differed in
terms of eligibility to attend post-secondary education. In
order to minimize such differences between groups, the
analyses in set one included only adolescents with a C
average or above (n = 9 excluded). Young-adult and adult
individuals with lower education levels were not excluded,
as inclusion of these individuals might provide a lower
threshold for comparing adolescents’ relative immaturity.
The adolescent sample (ages 14–17) consisted of 56 male
(Mage = 16.00; SD = 1.09) and 80 female (Mage = 15.71;
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 81
123
SD = 1.16) students enrolled in an urban public high school.
As seen in Table 1, socioeconomic status (SES), as mea-
sured by parents education level, was high school or less
(30.1% mothers, 31.3% fathers), college degree or some
college (49.1% mothers, 47.9% fathers), and graduate
school (20.9% mothers, 20.9% fathers). The adolescent
participants were freshman (37.0%), sophom*ores (5.5%),
juniors (33.5%), and seniors (23.8%). Grades for the last full
year completed in high school (average grade) was all A’s
(15.1%), A’s and B’s (54.2%), all B’s (5.4%), B’s and C’s
(22.3%), and all C’s (3%). The high school was selected
based on its socioeconomic diversity and it status as the main
school district associated with the delinquent facility. All
students present in selected classes on the day of the survey
participated in the study. Classes were chosen to incorporate
students with a wide-range of academic abilities.
The college student sample (ages 18–21) consisted of
116 male (Mage = 18.71; SD = .93) and 139 female
(Mage = 18.33; SD = .74) college undergraduates who
participated in the research for course credit. SES was high
school or less (25.1% mothers, 22.3% fathers), college
degree or some college (54.9% mothers, 55.9% fathers),
and graduate school (20.0% mothers, 21.8% fathers). The
college participants were freshman (78.2%), sophom*ores
(14.1%), juniors (6.0%), and seniors (1.6%). Grades for the
last full year completed in high school (average grade) was
all A’s (17.8%), A’s and B’s (64.0%), all B’s (7.1%), B’s
and C’s (10.7%), and all C’s (0%). The undergraduates
attended the largest public university in the same north-
eastern state from which the adolescent and delinquent
samples were drawn.
The young-adult sample (ages 22–27) consisted of 73
male (Mage = 24.35; SD = 1.75) and 72 female
(Mage = 23.91; SD = 1.90) participants. Education level
for the young-adult participants was less than high school
(5.0%), high school (38.3%) some college (48.2%), college
degree (5.7%) and some graduate school (2.8%).
The adult sample (ages 28–40) consisted of 71 male
(Mage = 34.19; SD = 4.27) and 75 female (Mage = 34.23;
SD = 3.87) participants. Education level for the adult
participants was less than high school (9.6%), high school
(18.5%) some college (43.2%), college degree (12.3%) and
some graduate school (16.4%).
Both the young-adult and adult samples were attained as
an upper-level undergraduate class research project,
wherein students were each assigned to distribute surveys
to 10 willing adults between the ages of 22 and 40. The
majority of young-adult and adult participants were rela-
tives, co-workers, bosses, and teachers associated with the
undergraduate researchers.
The male adolescent sample (ages 14–17) consisted of
61 male (Mage = 16.00; SD = 1.08) students enrolled in an
urban public high school. The male adolescent sample was
taken from the larger adolescent sample used above.
However, this sample included adolescents with less than a
C average. As seen in Table 2, SES as measured by parents
education level was high school or less (27.6% mothers,
30.5% fathers), college degree or some college (62.1%
mothers, 52.5% fathers), and graduate school (10.3%
mothers, 17.0% fathers). The adolescent male participants
were freshman (24.0%), sophom*ores (10.2%), juniors
(42.4%), and seniors (23.4%).
Finally, the delinquent sample consisted of 91 male
youth (ages 14–17, Mage = 15.67; SD = .75) detained in
the state delinquency facility. SES, as measured by parents
education level, was high school or less (79.9% mothers,
91.0% fathers), college degree or some college (15.7%
mothers, 6.8% fathers), and graduate school (4.4% moth-
ers, 2.2% fathers). The delinquent participants education
level was junior high school (6.7%), freshman (16.7%),
sophom*ore (40.0%), junior (25.6%), senior (5.6%), and
GED (5.4%) level.
As seen in Tables 1 and 2, the subjects’ race was pri-
marily Caucasian, a lack of racial diversity that is consis-
tent with the demographics of the New England state from
which the data were collected. Also seen in Table 1, for the
adult, young-adult, college, and adolescent samples, mul-
tivariate analysis of variance found significant differences
Table 1 Sample demographic information analysis set 1
Adolescent College student Young-adult Adult
Gender (% male) 41.2% 45.5% 50.3% 48.6%
Race (% Caucasian)* 91.1% 92.2% 93.0% 85.6%
SES*
% £ high school degree 35.2% 31.6% 5.3% 10.9%
% some college education 47.8% 44.6% 49.6% 28.9%
% college degree 7.3% 14.8% 42.1% 41.5%
% ‡ some graduate education 9.7% 9% 3% 18.7%
Note. SES is a proxy based on parents’ education level
* P £ .05
82 Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
123
in race and SES among groups. Thus these variables were
controlled in subsequent analyses. As seen in Table 2, for
the second set of analyses, comparing male adolescent and
delinquent groups, a multivariate analysis of variance
found significant differences in average grade, education
level, and SES. Thus, these variables were controlled
within this set of analyses.
Materials
Maturity of Judgment
Three factors employed by Cauffman and Steinberg (2000)
to assess psychosocial maturity (Cronbach a = .94) were
utilized. Responsibility was measured with the Psychoso-
cial Maturity Inventory (PSMI Form D; Greenberger et al.
1974), which consisted of 30 items such as ‘‘I often don’t
finish work I start’’, measured on a four-point Likert scale,
a = .88. Perspective was measured with the Consideration
of Future Consequences Scale (CFC) (Strathman et al.
1994) which consisted of 12 items, with responses indi-
cated on a five-point Likert scale. An example of items
included in this measure is: ‘‘I am willing to give up my
happiness right now in order to gain something in the fu-
ture.’’ Perspective was also measured via the Consideration
of Others subscale from the Weinberger Adjustment
Inventory (WAI; Weinberger and Schwartz 1990), which
consisted of seven questions, with responses indicated on a
five-point Likert scale. An example from this measure is:
‘‘I often go out of my way to do things for other people.’’
The two scales were transformed to standardized units and
averaged to generate a combined perspective measure that
was used in all analyses. For the combined perspective
measure, Cronbach’s a = .86. The final component of
maturity of judgment, temperance, was measured with two
subscales of the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory
(Weinberger and Schwartz 1990), Restraint and Impulse
Control, which were averaged to generate a combined
temperance measure. The Restraint sub-scale consisted of
seven items, such as ‘‘I say something mean to someone
who has upset me,’’ and the Impulse Control sub-scale,
which consisted of eight items, such as ‘‘I should try harder
to control myself when I’m having fun.’’ Responses from
both measures were indicated on a five-point Likert scale;
for the combined temperance measure, Cronbach’s a = .90.
A comprehensive measure of maturity of judgment was
Table 2 Sample demographic information analysis set 2
Male adolescent Delinquent youth
Mean age 16.00 (1.08) 15.67 (.75)
Race (% Caucasian) 90.2% 62%
SES*
% £ high school degree 38.2% 85.7%
% some college education 42.1% 11%
% college degree 10.7% 1.1%
% ‡ some graduate education 9% 2.2%
Average grades for most recent year in school*
All A’s 13.3% 0%
Primarily A’s and B’s 51.7% 15.9%
All B’s 6.7% 1.1%
Primarily B’s and C’s 16.7% 25.0%
All C’s 3.3% 3.4%
Primarily C’s and D’s 8.3% 14.8%
All D’s 0% 1.1%
Primarily D’s and F’s 0% 25%
All F’s 0% 12.5%
Highest grade-level completed in school*
9th grade 23.7% 17.9%
10th grade 10.2% 42.9%
11th grade 42.4% 27.4%
12th grade 22% 6%
GED 1.7% 1.2%
Note. SES is a proxy based on parents’ education level
* P < .05
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 83
123
created by averaging scores across factors of responsibility,
temperance, and perspective, Cronbach’s a = .79.
Antisocial Decision Making
The antisocial decision making scale was utilized by
Cauffman and Steinberg (2000) to gauge antisocial deci-
sion making, based on the Youth Decision-Making Ques-
tionnaire (Ford et al. 1990), Cronbach’s a = .90. The
questionnaire included nine vignettes, five of which were
utilized in the present study. An example includes ‘‘You’re
out shopping with some of your close friends and they
decide to take some clothing without paying for it. You
don’t think it’s a good idea, but they say you should take
something too.’’ Each vignette was followed by three
consequence scenarios: ‘‘Suppose that nothing bad would
happen to you (such as getting arrested)’’ (no conse-
quences), Cronbach’s a = .74, ‘‘Suppose that you didn’t
know whether something bad would happen to you’’
(uncertain consequences), Cronbach’s a = .76, and ‘‘Sup-
pose that something bad would happen to you’’ (definite
consequences), Cronbach’s a = .76, followed by the like-
lihood of engaging in the antisocial act, measured on a
four-point scale.
Delinquency
The delinquency measure was based on the delinquency
component of the National Youth Longitudinal Survey
(USBLS, n.d.), Cronbach’s a = .92. This measure asked:
‘‘In the last year (12 months) have you ever,’’ and con-
sisted of 16 items that pertain to three different areas of
delinquency: stealing offenses, property offenses, and as-
sault offenses. Delinquent youth were asked to consider
their last 12 months outside of their institution. Responses
are indicated with Yes/No answers. Data from the measure
was rescaled to a 100 point continuum to create a total
delinquency score that was utilized in all analyses.
Procedure
Appropriate IRB approval was obtained through the Uni-
versity. This approval allowed for passive consent from
parents of adolescent and delinquent participants.
For adolescents, permission was obtained from an urban
high school to survey students in a classes selected to in-
clude students on both lower and higher-level academic
tracks. Passive parental consent was obtained from the
youths’ parents and informed assent was obtained from the
adolescents. Students were told that their participation and
responses would not affect their academic status, and were
given a debriefing form upon completion of the survey.
College students participated in the experiment for class
credit. Students gave informed consent and were given a
debriefing form upon completion of the survey.
A community sample of young-adults and older adults
was obtained by assigning students in an upper level Psy-
chology class to survey 10 adults between the ages of 22
and 40 over the course of 2 weeks. The community sample
participants gave verbal consent and were given a
debriefing form upon completion of the survey.
The delinquent facility had custody of the program
youth; thus parental consent was not required. Nonetheless,
passive consent was obtained from the youths’ parents.
Informed assent was also obtained from the adolescents.
For the detained youth, each participant was given an as-
sent form, which was read aloud and explained. The
measures were administered to small groups of subjects
and read aloud as necessary, with an emphasis that par-
ticipation and responses would not affect legal status.
Youth were given a debriefing form upon completion of the
survey.
Results
The analyses were first conducted utilizing data from
adolescent, college student, young-adult, and adult sam-
ples. These analyses focused on age-group and gender
differences in maturity of judgment, followed by age-group
and gender differences in antisocial decision making and
delinquency. Finally, hierarchical regression analyses were
employed to assess the predictive utility of maturity of
judgment on total delinquency, above and beyond age,
gender, race, education level, SES, and antisocial decision
making.
The second segment of analyses focused on data from
male adolescents and delinquent youth. All adolescent
male participants were included in these analyses, regard-
less of school grades. Other age groups were not included
in these later analyses as they were expected to differ from
delinquents in a variety of ways (both age and delinquency)
which were beyond the scope of this research. This set of
analyses focused on delinquency group differences in
maturity of judgment, and the predictive utility of maturity
of judgment on total delinquency, above and beyond age,
race, average grades, education level, SES, and antisocial
decision making.
Gap 1: Adolescent vs. College Student, Young-Adult
and Adult Samples
First, age-group and gender differences on components of
maturity of judgment were assessed. Thus, a 4 · 2 MAN-
COVA was conducted, utilizing age-group (adolescent,
84 Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
123
college student, young-adult or adult) and gender as the
independent variables, components of maturity of judg-
ment (responsibility, temperance, and perspective) as the
dependent variables, and race, education level, and SES as
the covariates. Maturity of judgment was significantly re-
lated to age-group, although the strength of this association
was small (multivariate F(9, 1863) = 3.91, Pillai’s
Trace = .06, p < .001, g2 = .02). Significant univariate
differences were found for responsibility (F(3,
621) = 7.02, P < .001, g2 = .03) and perspective (F(3,
621) = 6.63, P < .001, g2 = .03), but not for temperance
(F(3, 621) = 2.51, ns, g2 = .01). As seen in Table 3, pair-
wise comparisons indicated age-based differences between
adolescents versus college students, young-adults, and
adults on responsibility and perspective, such that adoles-
cents displayed less responsibility and perspective than the
older age-groups. Further, on measures of temperance,
adults were significantly more mature than young-adults,
college students, and adolescents. Components of maturity
of judgment were also significantly related to gender, al-
though this association was small, as well (multivariate
F(3, 619) = 13.97, Pillai’s Trace = .06, P < .001,
g2 = .06). Females showed greater responsibility (univari-
ate F(1, 621) = 9.46, P < .01, g2 = .01), temperance (uni-
variate F(1, 621) = 30.64, P < .001, g2 = .05), and
perspective (univariate F(1, 621) = 30.86, P < .001,
g2 = .05) than males. However, maturity of judgment was
not significantly related to the interaction between age-
group and gender (multivariate F(9, 1863) = 1.37, Pillai’s
Trace = .02, ns, g2 = .01).
Next, age-group and gender differences on antisocial
decision making and delinquency scores were examined.
First, in order to assess age-group and gender differences
on each of the antisocial decision scenarios, a 4 · 2
MANCOVA was conducted. Age-group (adolescent, col-
lege student, young-adult or adult) and gender were utilized
as the independent variables, decision making scenarios
(responses to antisocial vignettes with no consequences,
uncertain consequences, and definite consequences) as the
dependent variables, and race, education level, and SES as
the covariates. Antisocial decision making was signifi-
cantly related to age group, although this association was
small (multivariate F(9, 1872) = 7.85, P < .001, Pillai’s
Trace = .11, g2 = .04). Univariate analyses indicated an
effect of age-group on the no consequence (F(3,
624) = 11.85, P < .001, g2 = .05), the uncertain conse-
quence (F(3, 624) = 16.59, P < .001, g2 = .07), and the
definite consequence (F(3, 624) = 11.38, P < .001,
g2 = .05) scenarios. Young-adults had the highest levels of
antisocial decision makings in the no and uncertain con-
sequence scenarios, whereas adolescents had the highest
level of antisocial decision making in the definite conse-
quence scenario. Pair-wise comparisons indicated that
adults were less likely to make antisocial decisions in the
no, uncertain, and definite consequence scenarios than any
of the younger age groups: adolescents, college students, or
young-adults. Further, adolescents were more likely to
make antisocial decisions than college students in the
definite consequence scenario (see Table 4). Antisocial
decision making also was significantly related to gender,
Table 3 Adjusted and unadjusted group means for components of maturity of judgment for adolescents, college students, young-adults, and
adults
Maturity of judgment Group Mean Adjusted meana Pairwise comparisons significant at P < .05
Responsibility Adolescentb 2.68 2.68 College; young-adult; adult
Collegec 2.93 2.95 Adolescent
Young-adultd 2.92 2.91 Adolescent
Adulte 3.09 3.04 Adolescent
Temperance Adolescentb 3.21 3.22 Adult
Collegec 3.29 3.28 Adult
Young-adultd 3.28 3.30 Adult
Adulte 3.55 3.50 Adolescent; college; young-adult
Perspective Adolescentb 3.16 3.16 College; young-adult; adult
Collegec 3.44 3.46 Adolescent
Young-adultd 3.38 3.36 Adolescent
Adulte 3.52 3.45 Adolescent
a Mean adjusted for race, education level, and SESb n = 132c n = 244d n = 131e n = 125
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 85
123
though this effect was small (F(3, 622) = 8.23, P < .001,
Pillai’s Trace = .04, g2 = .04). Univariate analyses indi-
cated an effect of gender on the no (F (1, 624) = 9.63,
P < .01, g2 = .02), uncertain (F (1, 624) = 17.50, P < .001,
g2 = .03), and definite (F (1, 624) = 23.66, P < .001,
g2 = .04) consequence scenarios, with females showing
less antisocial decision making in these contexts than
males. Antisocial decision making was not significantly
related to the interaction between age-group and gender
(multivariate F(9, 1872) = .85, Pillai’s Trace = .01, ns,
g2 = .00).
Gap 2: Delinquency Measure
To determine whether delinquency was significantly asso-
ciated with age-group and gender, a two-way analysis of
variance (ANCOVA) was conducted, utilizing age-group
(adolescent, college student, young-adult or adult) and
gender as the independent variables, total delinquency
score as the dependent variable, and race, education level,
and SES as the covariates. Delinquency was significantly
related to age-group, although the strength of this
association was small (univariate F(3, 624) = 12.59,
P < .001, g2 = .06). As seen in the bottom of Table 4,
pairwise comparisons indicated adults showed less delin-
quency than the adolescent, college student, and young-
adult samples, whereas young-adults showed less delin-
quency than adolescents or college students. Delinquency
was also significantly related to gender, though the strength
of this relation was small (univariate F(1, 624) = 27.19,
P < .001, g2 = .04), with females showing less delin-
quency than males. However, delinquency was not signif-
icantly related to the interaction between age-group and
gender (multivariate F(3, 624) = .21, ns, g2 = .00).
A final analysis assessed the predictive usefulness of
maturity of judgment on total delinquency, above and be-
yond age, gender, race, education level, SES, and antisocial
decision making. A hierarchical regression was conducted,
entering age, gender, race, education level, SES, and
antisocial decision making on step one and the composite
measure of maturity of judgment on step two. If age,
gender, race, education level, SES, and antisocial decision
making differences in delinquency were attributable to
differences in maturity of judgment, then any significant
Table 4 Adjusted and unadjusted group means for antisocial decision making components and delinquency for adolescents, college students,
young-adults, and adults
Antisocial decision making Group Mean Adjusted meana Pairwise comparisons significant at P < .05
No consequences Adolescentb 2.38 2.42 Adult
Collegec 2.53 2.56 Adult
Young-adultd 2.57 2.50 Adult
Adulte 2.13 2.11 Adolescent; college; young-adult
Uncertain consequences Adolescentb 2.05 2.09 Adult
Collegec 2.05 2.07 Adult
Young-adultd 2.14 2.10 Adult
Adulte 1.71 1.69 Adolescent; college; young-adult
Definite consequences Adolescentb 1.30 1.30 College; adult
Collegec 1.57 1.55 Adolescent; adult
Young-adultd 1.51 1.51 Adult
Adulte 1.60 1.63 Adolescent; college; young-adult
Delinquency Adolescentf 18.52 18.93 Young-adult; adult
Collegeg 17.26 17.48 Young-adult; adult
Young-adulth 12.83 12.67 Adolescent; college; adult
Adulti 10.27 8.64 Adolescent; college; young-adult
a Mean adjusted for race, education level, and SESb n = 132c n = 247d n = 130e n = 126f n = 133g n = 247h n = 131i n = 124
86 Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
123
effect at stage one should become non-significant at stage
two. As seen in Table 5, on step one, age, gender, race,
education level, SES, and antisocial decision making were
significant predictors of delinquency, with a moderate
relation between the variables (F(6, 624) = 43.84,
P < .001; Adjusted R2 = .29). Once maturity of judgment
was entered into the second step of the equation, maturity
of judgment, age, gender, and decision making were sig-
nificant, moderate to strong predictors of delinquency (F(7,
623) = 51.27, P < .001; Adjusted R2 = .36). However, re-
sults indicated that maturity of judgment (b = –.33) rather
than age (b = –.13), gender (b = –.09), or decision making
(b = .26), was the most powerful predictor of delinquency;
R2 = .30 for Step 1; DR2 = .07 for Step 2 (P < .001).
Gap 3: Adolescent vs. Delinquent Samples
The final set of analyses was based on two male adolescent
samples. One sample was drawn from the high school
group utilized above, with the exception that adolescents
with below a C average were included for this set. The
second sample consisted of male adjudicated adolescents
drawn from a state juvenile delinquency facility. In order to
assess delinquency group differences in maturity of judg-
ment, two analyses were conducted, one based on delin-
quency group (male adolescent or delinquent youth) and
the other based on cut-score delinquency group (low or
high). For the latter analysis, total delinquency scores were
used to form two cut-score delinquency groups, low
delinquent (MDelinquency = 23.45, SD = 14.92) and high
delinquent (MDelinquency = 80.64, SD = 12.35).
First, a t-test was run to confirm that total delinquency
score differed by delinquency group (male adolescent or
delinquent youth). Results suggested that male adolescents
(MDelinquency = 22.34, SD = 17.73) engaged in a signifi-
cantly fewer delinquent behaviors than delinquent youth
(MDelinquency = 73.30, SD = 20.70) (t(151) = –15.77,
P < .001). Next, to test whether maturity of judgment was
significantly related to delinquency group, a multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted, uti-
lizing delinquency group (male adolescent or delinquent
youth) as the independent variable, the three separate
components of maturity of judgment (responsibility, tem-
perance, perspective) as the dependent variables, and age,
race, average grade, education level, and SES as the co-
variates. Results indicated that maturity of judgment did
not significantly vary by delinquency group, (multivariate
F(3, 127) = 2.14, ns, Pillai’s Trace = .05, g2 = .05).
Due to significant within-group variation in delin-
quency, as seen in the standard deviations of the delin-
quency groups: male adolescent (SD = 17.73) and
delinquent youth (SD = 20.70), both groups were com-
bined to form two categories based on delinquency cut-
score. Those youth (whether high school youth or delin-
Table 5 Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting total delinquency for adolescents, college students, young-adults,
and adults and male adolescents and delinquents
Variable Adolescents, college students, young-adults, and adults Male adolescents and delinquents
B SE B B B SE B b
Step 1
Age –.28 .08 –.14* 2.17 2.49 .06
Gender –3.62 .93 –.13*
Race 1.54 .78 .07* –2.82 1.88 –.09
Average grade 4.04 .85 .31*
Education level –.03 .02 –.08* –3.88 1.78 –.16*
SES –.68 .31 –.08* –3.00 1.14 –.17*
Antisocial decision making 11.50 .96 .43* 20.67 2.9 .46*
Step 2
Age –.27 .08 –.13* 2.38 2.48 .07
Gender –2.34 .90 –.09*
Race 1.43 .74 .06 –2.96 1.87 –.09
Average grade 3.67 .87 .29*
Education level –.03 .02 –.06 –3.38 1.79 –.14
SES –.33 .29 –.04 –2.38 1.18 –.13*
Antisocial decision making 7.01 1.06 .26* 18.09 3.25 .40*
Maturity of judgment –7.69 .93 –.33* –5.69 3.31 –.14
Note. Average grade is scored such that higher grades are equated with lower numbers. SES is a proxy based on parents’ education level
* P < .05
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 87
123
quent) with delinquency scores above the 50th percentile
were labeled high delinquent and those youth (whether
high school youth or delinquent) with delinquency scores
below the 50th percentile were labeled low delinquent.
To test whether maturity of judgment was significantly
related to cut-score delinquency group, a multivariate
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted, uti-
lizing cut-score delinquency group (low or high) as the
independent variable, the three separate components of
maturity of judgment (responsibility, temperance, per-
spective) as the dependent variables, and age, race, average
grades, education level, and SES as the covariates. Overall
maturity of judgment was related to delinquency group,
although the strength of this association was small (mul-
tivariate F(3, 121) = 5.78, P = .001, Pillai’s Trace = .13,
g2 = .13). As seen in Table 6, univariate analyses indicated
an effect of delinquency group on temperance (F(1,
123) = 16.64, P < .001, g2 = .12) and perspective (F(1,
123) = 6.35, P < .05, g2 = .05), such that low delinquency
youth displayed higher temperance and perspective than
high delinquency youth.
The final analysis assessed the predictive usefulness of
maturity of judgment on total delinquency. A hierarchical
regression was conducted, entering age, race, average
grade, education level, SES, and antisocial decision making
on step one, the composite measure of maturity of judg-
ment on step two, and total delinquency as the dependent
variable. If age, race, average grade, grade level, SES, and
antisocial decision making differences were attributable to
differences in maturity of judgment, then any significant
effect at step one should become non-significant at step
two. As seen in Table 5, on step one, average grade, grade
level, SES, and antisocial decision making were significant
predictors of total delinquency (F(6, 129) = 31.13,
P < .001; Adjusted R2 = .57). However, once maturity of
judgment was entered into the second step of the equation,
only average grade, SES, and antisocial decision making
were significant predictors of delinquency (F(7,
128) = 27.50, P < .001; Adjusted R2 = .58).
Discussion
The present study extends previous findings of age-based
differences in maturity of judgment, linking immature
judgment to antisocial decision making and delinquency
in male and female adolescents, college students, young-
adults, and adults, and male delinquents. Results suggest
that adolescents are less mature on the judgment factors
of responsibility and perspective relative to college stu-
dents, young-adults, and adults. Further, maturity of
judgment predicted total delinquency beyond the contri-
butions of age, gender, race, education level, SES, and
antisocial decision making. In addition, findings suggest
there are no significant maturity of judgment differences
between incarcerated delinquent and non-delinquent
youth. However, in a sample of male high school
students and incarcerated delinquents, low and high
Table 6 Adjusted and unadjusted group means for maturity of judgment components for male adolescent and delinquent youth and low and high
delinquency groups
Maturity of judgment component Group Mean Adjusted meana
Responsibility Male adolescentb 2.49 2.14 a
Delinquentc 1.92 2.18 a
Low delinquencyd 2.37 2.14 a
High delinquencye 1.97 2.18 a
Temperance Male adolescentb 3.07 2.81 a
Delinquentc 2.01 2.26 b
Low delinquencyd 3.07 2.80 a
High delinquencye 1.94 2.17 b
Perspective Male adolescentb 2.95 2.73 a
Delinquentc 2.17 2.42 a
Low delinquencyd 2.90 2.71 a
High delinquencye 2.14 2.31 b
Note. Adjusted means with different letters differ at the P < .05 levela Mean adjusted for age, race, average grade, education level, and SESb n = 58c n = 79d n = 63e n = 72
88 Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91
123
delinquency youth differed on measures of temperance
and perspective.
The first set of analyses consisted of adolescent, college
student, young-adult, and adult samples. Similar to past
research (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000), overall age-based
differences were found on maturity of judgment. The
current study found adolescents displayed less responsi-
bility and perspective than college students, young-adults,
or adults. Although it was hypothesized that college stu-
dents would display less mature judgment than young-
adults and adults, this was not the case. However, on
measures of temperance, adults were more mature than
adolescents, college students, and young-adults. This
finding suggests that maturity of judgment factors of
responsibility and perspective may remain relatively stable
beyond the age of 18, but that emotional temperance may
continue to improve through the mid to late twenties. In-
deed, recent physiological findings support brain-based
maturation in college students, which may be linked to
emotional and behavioral regulation (Bennett and Baird in
press). Such results underscore the importance of adult
sampling in maturity of judgment research, delineating the
differences between college students, young-adults ages
22–27, and adults ages 28 and above.
In addition, the current study found several age-based
differences in antisocial decision making and delinquency.
First, in situations with no, uncertain, and definite negative
consequences, adults were less likely to make antisocial
decisions than adolescents, college students, or young-
adults. Results of the no and uncertain consequences sce-
nario suggest that college students and young-adults may
be more akin to adolescents than adults in their inclination
to engage in antisocial decision making. This finding dif-
fers from Cauffman and Steinberg’s (1996) work, which
posits that antisocial decision making does not increase
past the age of 19. However, the current study’s results are
in-line with physiological (Giedd et al. 1999; Reiss et al.
1996) and sociological (Farrington 1986) research which
suggests that some individuals may be prone to engage in
antisocial decision making through their early twenties.
At the same time, results from the definite consequence
scenario, wherein negative consequences are certain to
occur, show that adolescents were more likely to make
antisocial decisions than either college students or adults.
Making an antisocial decision when it is known that neg-
ative consequences will definitely result may be considered
the least ‘‘rational’’ or ‘‘mature’’ choice available. It is
unclear whether this decision is based on a failure to
consider negative consequences, an underestimation of
such consequences, or an over-emphasis on positive con-
sequences. In all, this pattern of results highlights the need
for continued research on age-based differences between
adolescents, college students, young-adults, and adults.
The current study also extends previous works through
its inclusion of a self-report measure of delinquency
(Cauffman and Steinberg 2000; Fried and Reppucci 2001).
Results showed that adults engaged in significantly less
delinquency than adolescents, college students, and young-
adults, and showed that young-adults engaged in less
delinquent behavior than adolescents and college students.
These findings partially support the age-based delinquency
hypothesis. Indeed, the finding that adolescents and college
students were most delinquent runs parallel to recent
physiological research (Giedd et al. 1999) and again
emphasizes the potential comparability of adolescents and
college students relative to older adults.
Further, the current study found that for adolescents,
college students, young-adults, and adults, maturity of
judgment predicted total delinquency above and beyond
age, gender, race, education level, SES, and antisocial
decision making. This finding is in-line with the study’s
hypothesis and shows strong support for the robust asso-
ciation between immaturity of judgment and delinquency.
Although the current study is cross-sectional, this result
further supports the thesis that psychosocial factors may be
highly predictive of delinquent behavior.
The second analysis set compared male adolescent and
delinquent youth samples on measures of maturity of
judgment, antisocial decision making, and delinquency.
This analysis set is useful for describing adolescent within
group differences. The maturity of judgment thesis sug-
gests that adolescents make antisocial decisions based in
part on psychosocial influences that are characteristic of
their age group (Scott and Grisso 1997). Yet because
delinquent youth make more antisocial choices than their
non-delinquent peers, it was hypothesized that delinquent
youth would be less mature in their judgment than male
high school students.
Delinquency group (male adolescent versus delinquent
youth) differences were not found on maturity of judgment.
The lack of significant differences between delinquent and
non delinquent youth on maturity of judgment was unex-
pected. However, the delinquency group variable is likely
impacted by extraneous factors that determine who is
caught, prosecuted, and convicted. Whereas the self-report
measure of delinquency likely provides a more accurate
assessment of antisocial behavior. Indeed, when two
groups were formed based on delinquency cut-scores, the
individual temperance and perspective factors significantly
differed between the two groups, such that heightened
involvement in delinquent acts was associated with less
temperance and perspective. These results suggest that
emotional temperance and perspective may play an
important role in delinquent behavior. This outcome war-
rants attention, as well, based on Cauffman and Steinberg’s
(2000) finding that of the three judgment factors, temperance
Law Hum Behav (2008) 32:78–91 89
123
showed the most significant developmental changes, which
occurred between ages 16 and 19.
There are a number of limitations to the current study.
First, the current study is cross sectional in nature, and thus
does not allow for conclusions regarding prediction and
change in maturity of judgment over time. Further, al-
though this study’s hypotheses are based, in part, on recent
neurological findings of adolescent and post-adolescent
maturation, this work attempts to link the two trajectories
only in theory, and cannot empirically investigate this
hypothesized association. At the same time, the current
study excluded younger adolescents, age 12–13, a sample
that would be useful for tracking maturity of judgment in
conjunction with the onset of delinquent behaviors. Finally,
this research does not control for cognitive ability, and past
research has indicated that IQ is associated with decision
maturity (Grisso et al. 2003; Schmidt et al. 2003). Instead,
in an attempt to control for cognitive ability in age-based
comparisons, the analyses in set one excluded adolescents
with high school grades that were below a C average. In an
attempt to control for cognitive ability in male adolescents
and delinquent youth, all analyses in set two controlled for
current average grade and grade level. Although male
adolescents and delinquent youth did not differ in their
maturity of judgment, the samples did differ vastly in their
academic achievement.
In light of the study’s limitations, the current research
continues to offer worthwhile insight into maturity of
judgment and its relation to delinquency. In all, the results
of this study replicate and extend the immature judgment
hypothesis (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000). These findings
suggest that adolescents show reduced maturity of judg-
ment in comparison to college students, young-adults, and
adults, and that even college student and young-adult
samples (ages 22–27) may display reduced temperance in
comparison to adults. Further, adolescents were more
likely to make antisocial decisions than college students or
adults, but not young-adults, in contexts where negative
consequences were certain to occur. Again, the endorse-
ment of antisocial choices under such circ*mstances sug-
gests a less rational or logical decision process in
adolescents and perhaps young-adults, as compared to
adults. In addition, adolescents and college students were
most delinquent as compared to young-adults and adults.
Finally, analyses that were based on both detained and non-
detained samples support the notion that immaturity of
judgment may play an important role in delinquent
behavior.
If future research replicates the current findings, this
will provide support for policies within the criminal
justice system that view adolescents as differing in
developmental maturity from adults. Such policies may
hold youth accountable, but less culpable than adults for
their crimes (Woolard et al. 1996). In addition,
researchers may be inclined to investigate youth inter-
vention programming with potential to improve maturity
of judgment. However, caution must be taken with such
applications. If intervention programs are conceived such
that psychosocial maturity is improved, this does not
suggest that more psychosocially mature youth should
then be tried as adults in criminal court. Instead, it must
be underscored that immature judgment is one of many
facets of adolescent development that potentially should
be taken into account when creating criminal sanctions
for youth.
Acknowledgments Special thanks to Ellen Cohn for help with
study design and data collection, to two anonymous reviewers, Vicki
Banyard, Cesar Rebellon, and Jen Woolard for their helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this manuscript, and to Becky Warner for
feedback on statistical analyses. Many thanks to Kara O’Connor and
Heather Budrewicz, for their research assistance. This research was
funded in part by a Grant-in-Aid from the American Psychology-Law
Society.
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